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Abstract: In this essay we argue for the utility of moving from a “national” to an
“entangled global” perspective on security. Focusing on the post-1945 interna-
tional context, we discuss how the concept of “globality” can inform and reframe
our understanding of transnational security dynamics and help move us beyond
traditional state-centric frameworks. Such a move enables a better understanding
of historical events and contemporary security dynamics than classical “national
security” frameworks alone. After outlining the rationale behind our call for
expanding the aperture in the study of security, we theorize security entanglement
as a particularly important form of globality with its own internal dynamics and
show how the entanglement framework allows us to rethink the post-1945 security
environment and events within it. We then focus on three illustrative forms of
security entanglement that have beenunderexplored in security studies: the global
nature of the Cold War; dynamics of decolonization and its legacies; and the
relationship between migration and security. We conclude by discussing the im-
plications of security entanglement for future visions of world security.
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1 Introduction
Security studies has historically been a largely state-centric discipline, although
there is an increased recognition of the need to move beyond methodological
nationalist frameworks (Adamson 2016, 2018, 2020). By reframing security in
reference to notions of globality, we gain insights into the extent to which the post-
1945 global security environment has been entangled and interconnected. This in
turn opens up new possibilities for understanding a range of security relationships
and issues, bringing new actors and spaces into our understanding of global
security in ways that force a reconsideration of global security dynamics.
In this essay, we argue that to accurately apprehend the international security
environment, it is imperative to move from a “national” to an “entangled global”
perspective on security and its domestic and international political implications. As
we illustrate in the sections that follow, understandings and interpretations ofmany
events and dynamics are deepened and, in some instances, altered, when viewed
through the lens of security entanglement (as opposed to traditional national
frameworks).As such, this piece joins agrowing strandof scholarship that argues for
expanding the aperture to a global scale in analyzing both historical events and
contemporary relationships, with the objective of refining our knowledge of the past
and better interpreting and responding to contemporary events and dynamics.
The rest of this essay proceeds in the followingmanner. First, we theorize security
entanglement as a form of globality, and discuss how this framework allows us to
rethink and better understand the post-1945 security environment. We then focus on
three forms of security entanglement that have been under-explored in the field of
security studies: the global nature of the ColdWar; dynamics of decolonization and its
legacies; and the relationship between migration and security. We conclude by dis-
cussing the implications of security entanglement for future visions of world security.
2 Entangled Security as a Form of Globality
The concept of globality has become an increasingly accepted way of conceptu-
alizing the deep interconnections that exist between and across societies,
signaling a structural and conceptual shift away from states and regions to an
integrated global perspective. Building upon approaches that focus on trans-
nationalism, interdependence, or “world society” approaches, the ontological
starting point of globality is that theworld is and should be conceived of as a single
entity (Robertson 1992). This suggests not just a material understanding of global
interconnectivity, but also a broader perceptual, subjective and normative un-
derstanding of theworld as a “shared social space.” (Bartelson 2010;McGrew 2014,
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18; Weinart 2020, 480.) The very concept suggests the need for broadening the
scope of security studies to include an understanding of how dynamics in different
parts of the globe resonate and affect one another, taking a multi-perspective
approach rather than a national approach.
The emergence of “global security studies” as a distinct paradigm for under-
standing security dynamics and governance1 points to some of the ways in which a
“global perspective”might differ frommore traditional statist approaches to security.
For example, this new framework implies the need to think historically, under-
standing states not just as actors in the international system, but also as material
outcomes of complex historical processes. The framework further suggests the utility
of focusing onnon-state spaces and geographies of security (such as urban security or
translocal security assemblages) as well as incorporating non-state networks and
actors into understandings of global power politics (Goddard and Nexon 2016;
Greenhill 2008, 2010). Additionally, the framework fits well with projects that seek to
“decolonize” the field of security studies, shifting the focus away from the security
interests and practices of states in the Global North, to a global perspective that seeks
to analyze and understand the interconnections and relationships that exist between
the Global North and the Global South (Bilgin 2016). Building on this literature, we
suggest the notion of entangled security as a means of capturing the globality of
security dynamics, and of pushing the field of security studies to engage with global
historical approaches that are reinterpreting modernity in ways that begin not with
discrete units of analysis, but rather by analyzing their spatial connections (see, e.g.,
Bayly 2004; Gould 2007; Subrahmanyan 2000).
The concept of security entanglement points to how both national and inter-
national security are inherently deeply relational and ontologically interconnected
phenomena that do not exist prior to, nor separate from, dynamic interactionswith
other phenomena (see e.g., Elbe and Buckland-Merrett 2019).2 Entanglement also
suggests the possibility of transcending international and national divides to
examine other spaces and cross-cutting dynamics and thereby to understand se-
curity dynamics as not just taking place within the international system, but as
fundamentally constitutive of world orders.
Embracing the concept of entangled security as a form of globality represents
an expansion rather than a repudiation of dominant foundational assumptions in
international relations. Metaphorically, it calls for a bigger analytical tent rather
than a different circus. For instance, adoption of the concept of entanglement does
not necessitate abandoning the assumption of anarchy –which is to say, that there
1 As evidenced by new academic journals such as Journal of Global Security Studies.
2 We are using the term “entanglement” somewhat more phenomenologically than other disci-
plines, such as History.
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exists no world government nor supranational authority above that of states.
Neither does it necessitate abandoning the centrality of states as fundamental
actors in contemporary world politics. Joint assumptions of globality and anarchy,
for example, can help us better understand the activities of and relationships
within and between nation-states bymore fully recognizing the interconnectivity of
states and non-state actors and the influence of non-great power actors on the
behavior of great powers (see also Adamson 2016).3 States’ self-interested prefer-
ences and objectives remain the same, but the roles, preferences, objectives and
outcomes of other actors–and their interconnectivity with those of (dominant)
states – also become key parts of the equation.
We propose a broader, more inclusive theoretical approach to security
because privileging a focus on national frameworks to the exclusion of their global
dimensionality has muddled our understanding of security events and relation-
ships in several respects. For example, categorizing conflicts as inclusively either
between orwithinnation-states disregards and sometimes even belies howwars are
actually fought. It also leaves out categories of conflict that do not neatly fit into
either category. This in turn can materially hamper scholars’ and practitioners’
abilities to analyze conflicts as well as, where appropriate, to devise effective
interventions (Greenhill and Staniland 2007). Second, national bias functionally
erases from our analytical universe cases “in which the center of gravity (Clau-
sewitz 1989) of a ‘civil war’ or other conflict actually exists external to a state” – a
common feature of many contemporary conflicts (Adamson 2016, 22). Third, se-
curity dynamics that are in reality complicated and do not readily fit within
dominant categories get shoehorned into them anyway, and distinct phenomena
become conflated. For example, the “external” dimensions of some “internal”
conflicts become obscured, while “local conflicts” that are anything but “may be
misunderstood due to a dominant spatial imaginary that treats the state as the
space where civil wars take place (i.e., within state boundaries)” (ibid).
Taken together, these tendencies in turn obscure both the globality of security
and the prevalence of security entanglement within the global. Thus disembedded
from larger global forces, spatially “inconvenient” dynamics such as covert and
proxy wars are ignored or given short shrift analytically (Barkawi and Laffey 1999,
2006) Similarly, the role of the Global South in security studies – the physical
terrain upon which many of these Northern conflicts are fought – is treated as
3 Put another way, biologists can simultaneously recognize the fundamental significance and
independent functions of a body’s various organs and the criticality of interconnectivity of organs
and their systemic relationships to one another within a single entity/organism – i.e., a human
being. See also other examples from the natural world, such as the role of fungi in forging
connections, interactions and communication across both plants and animals (Sheldrake 2020).
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peripheral rather than central. Correspondingly, the central roles played and
agency exercised by actors within the South are discounted or ignored.
This bias in turn reinforces a long recognized tendency in the security studies
literature to downplay or disregard processes of internal state mobilization,
cohesion, and repression (see e.g., Ayoob 1991, 1997). At the same time, the
enduring legacies, effects and episodic blowback and fallout in the North from
great power nation-state intervention in the South – be it in the form of long-term
colonialismor short-termmilitary operations– continue to bemyopically analyzed
and incompletely understood. These analytical shortcomings adversely distort our
understanding of historical events and in turn stymie contemporary policymakers’
efforts to engage in effective diplomacy and design and implement policy re-
sponses acceptable to the relevant international parties, friend and foe alike. In the
section that follows, we discuss three concrete manifestations of the interplay of
these factors in action and the implications thereof.
3 Entangled Security and the Post-1945
International Order
Taking the “global” as a “unit of analysis” suggests a different lens and starting
point for theorizing security. Rather than focusing only on “national interests” and
security policy-making in the capitals of the world’s major powers, the concept of
security entanglement prioritizes the relational and interactive aspects of security
that extend beyond the policy priorities of great powers. Furthermore, security
entanglement suggests taking a constitutive approach to understanding the rela-
tionship between security dynamics and the shaping of global orders.We examine
these relationships more closely now by looking at three aspects of the post-1945
global order: the global Cold War; decolonization; and the relationship between
migration and security. Each of these developments are evidence of the entangled
nature of the global security environment, and demonstrate the utility and desir-
ability of viewing security entanglement as a distinct form of globality.
3.1 The Globality of the Cold War and Its Post-Cold War
Consequences
Traditionally the term “Cold War” has been understood to refer to the deep, long-
standing, and intense security competition between the United States and the
Soviet Union that emerged at the end of the Second World War and ebbed and
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flowed until the collapse of the USSR nearly 50 years later. This bipolar world order
is often studied as a system of interstate alliances, principally in the Global North,
which enabled a period of global stability, commonly referred to as “the Long
Peace” (Gaddis 1987; Waltz 1979). Even today, this period continues to be widely
viewed and analyzed in the Global North as a contest between two superpower
states and as a largely bloodless competition at that, since the two contenders
largely managed to avoid coming to blows directly and averted nuclear catastro-
phe. Yet, this perspective is one that is only possible if one ignores the globality of
the Cold War – something mainstream historians would acknowledge – a period
marked by 30 interstate and extra systemic wars and 251 international crises and
not a single year free of war (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1991, 86; Hanhimäki and
Westad 2003; MacMillan 2020; Westad 2017). Moreover, a goodly number of these
conflicts featured deep and sustained superpower involvement. Throughout the
Global South, the ideological and power positional battles of the North raged in
internal, transnational, international and deeply entangled wars that were any-
thing but cold.
The ideological nature of the Cold War meant the conflict was omnipresent,
and the security competition that played out was truly global, in both physical and
figurative senses. The conflict touched every region of the world, with effects that
reverberated through every other region in interconnected and reinforcing ways.
Indeed, the ColdWar – rather than the “world war” that preceded it –was the first
truly global armed conflict. Like World War I before it, World War II featured
fighting across multiple continents and encompasses many regions of the world.
Yet broad swaths of the globe – including Latin America, North America, South
Asia and much of sub-Saharan Africa – were not significant theaters of combat.
This was not the case during the Cold War. Previously protected regions were
theatres of fierce and sustained fighting in which millions died.
Moreover, the ideological dimension, vast geographies and perceived global
stakes of the Cold War also meant that leaders of the superpowers became even
more than usually preoccupied with issues of credibility, reputation, and
metaphorically-falling dominoes. Both US and Soviet leaders became fixated on
the idea that if one state fell to the other side, so would its neighbors, and then the
neighbors of the neighbors and so on. Such apprehensions led the superpowers to
intervene around the globe, sometimes with their own troops, sometimes with
advisors and proxies, and sometimes through non-military means of support, in
support of both states and non-state actors.
The worldwide preoccupations of the superpowers in turn offered significant
leverage and opportunities to less powerful players. A wide range of actors in the
Global South, including leaders of newly-formed states, various types of liberation
and oppositionmovements, (would-be) insurgents and other non-state actors took
full advantage of superpower concerns to lobby for such support. The global
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political economy of the ColdWar had lasting effects on state-society relations and
state-formation trajectories across the Global South, as Cold War military aid
shifted the balance of civil-military relations towards increased militarization and
internal repression (Tilly 1992, 192ff). Fortified and emboldened if they received
aid, some incumbents used outside military assistance to ruthlessly strengthen
their hold on power, while non-state actors launched new challenges to domestic
governance.
Indeed, a growing body of recent scholarship posits that actors in the South
were often less the victims of superpowermachinations than the other way around
(see e.g., Lüthi 2020). As Chamberlin (2018, 3) pithily put it, “While the drive to
contain their rival’s influence dragged Washington and Moscow into the post-
colonial world, Third World revolutionaries and political leaders fought to realize
their own visions of decolonization and liberation. Local forces joined the struggle
along the ColdWar frontiers in complex patterns of collaboration, co-optation, and
resistance in bids to assert their own influence while manipulating superpower
anxieties to win vital assistance for their local struggles. As they did so, regional
powers disrupted superpower designs and redirected currents of international
power.” This, in a nutshell, describes the globality of Cold War dynamics.
From a security entanglements perspective, all parties to the Cold War – not
just the US and the USSR – were consequential, with exercise-able and exercised
agency, while operating within a broader structural context defined by large-scale
and entrenched inequalities. Radical variations in the distribution of power, re-
sources, and access to their employment obviously meant that some states and
some actors exercised more and greater control over events and outcomes than
others. But the Cold War strategic chessboard was a global one, and the super-
powers were sometimes the exploiters, sometimes the exploited, and more influ-
ence and agency resided outside of the US-USSR dyad than the conventional
wisdom suggests. Even actors who officially claimed they were at a remove and
uninvolved – for instance, members of the Non-Aligned Movement – in effect
acknowledged involvement, while qualifying and delineating the ostensible na-
ture of their role(s), by publicly asserting their lack of alignment.
Cold War battlefields served as environments in which the superpowers, local
governments, insurgents, and social revolutionaries (re-)introduced and “refined
techniques of mass violence, rewrote the politics of revolution, and reshaped the
structures of world power, [forging along the way …] many of the greatest
geopolitical transformations of the 20th and 21st centuries” (Chamberlin 2018, 3).
One obvious example, as discussed further below, was the consolidation of a new
system of postcolonial states –which, in many cases, remained shot through with
informal colonial ties and structures that continue to exercise material effects on
the politics, economics and societies of ostensibly independent, but not fully
untethered states (Getachew 2020). The evolution of these post-colonial
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relationships also transformed key domestic and international political processes
and their meanings and manifestations. As Getachew argues, for instance, by the
mid-1970s, the concept of self-determination fell out of favor in some circles,
including the US, as a consequence of the battle between “anticolonial national-
ists” who viewed the United Nations as a site of “postcolonial revolution” and
those who viewed the institution as “a forum for cooperation, collective security
and American-centered consensus” (ibid., 178). The knock-on effects of this
disagreement on the health, robustness and efficacy of the UN and other multi-
national organizations continue to redound in the contemporary global.
Another transformative consequence of Cold War entanglement was the
emergence of counter-hegemonic religious movements and ideologies that
emerged during the Cold War, but continue to dominate security concerns and
discourse today. These include the United States’ funding of the anti-Soviet
mujahideen fighters during the proxy war in Afghanistan in themid-1980s and the
globalization of anti-hegemonic forms of jihadism that followed, which in turn
inspired the attacks on the US on September 11, 2001. The actors that planned these
attacks – as well as some of their sponsors and safe havens, including
Afghanistan – then in turn became the target of the subsequent Global War on
Terror in the first two decades of the 21st century. Some of those targets formed the
backbone of jihadist movements that expanded their battlefields across swaths of
Europe, theMiddle East, sub-SaharanAfrica and South and Southeast Asia (Cooley
2002).
A third very significant example of globally entangled security consequences
surrounds the interconnections, backlash. and blowback between covert in-
terventions by the superpowers into the domestic affairs of states in the South.
Consider, for instance, the CIA-backed 1953 coup that resulted in the overthrow of
the democratically-elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq. For the
Iranian leader and his party, the key issue at play was Iran’s right to nationalize a
British-owned oil company (Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) that held exclusive rights
to the country’s petroleum. For the newly inaugurated Eisenhower administration,
in contrast, a possible Soviet takeover was at stake. Many Iranians – aware of
American involvement from the outset – viewed the coup as a betrayal by the US of
its own values, in facilitating the deposition of an elected leader and abetting the
undemocratic ambitions of Shah Mohammed Pahlavi (within the US, in contrast,
the CIA’s role in the operation remained classified and unknown to most Ameri-
cans until well after the end of the Cold War).
While the Iranian domino did not fall to Communism, and the covert action
was viewed as a policy success by the Eisenhower Administration, an array of
significant regional and global consequences meant the coup’s cost over the
longer-termwould prove quite high. One such consequencewas the rise of political
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Islam, which led directly to the 1979 revolution and still ongoing acute hostility in
Iranian-U.S. relations. More broadly, as Zahrani concludes, “So traumatic was the
coup’s legacy that when the Shah finally departed in 1979, many Iranians feared a
repetition of 1953, which was one of the motives for the student seizure of the U.S.
embassy. The hostage crisis, in turn, precipitated the Iraqi invasion of Iran, while
the revolution itself played a part in the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan. A
lot of [globally entangled] history, in short, flowed from a single week in Tehran”
(Zahrani 2002: 93, passim). That contemporary historians (as well as intelligence
analysts at the time) agree that fears of a Communist takeover were overblown at
best makes the implications of this apparently local, but deeply globally entan-
gled, Cold War event particularly noteworthy (see e.g. Gasiorowski 2019).
3.2 Neocolonialism and Enduring Forms of Postcolonial
Entanglement
The globality of the Cold War provided the broader backdrop for a second process
that accelerated and defined the post-1945 period; namely, decolonization. In the
three decades that followed WWII, struggles for independence throughout Africa,
East and South Asia, and the Middle East were fought and won, sometimes
peacefully, but often in the form of wars of national liberation. Membership in the
United Nations grew from 51 to 144 countries between 1945 and 1975, reaching 192
states a few decades thereafter (Getachew 2020). This is often interpreted as a
period inwhich the nation-state system spread fromEurope to the rest of the globe,
resulting in the emergence of a global society of autonomous and sovereign states
and hailing a new era of political, economic and, to a lesser degree, cultural
decolonization and disentanglement.
The reality is more complicated, however, as the processes of decolonization
and postcolonial state-building were characterized by forms of globality and se-
curity entanglement that are often rendered invisible inmainstream approaches to
security studies. National wars of liberation and independence, for example, could
neither be classified as interstate nor as civil wars, and did not neatly fit the
categories used to design conflict datasets that informed quantitative analysis of
warfare. Eventually they were included as “extra-systemic” conflicts in datasets
such as the Correlates ofWar (COW) andUCDP data, yet such conflicts nonetheless
continue to challenge the state-centric and methodologically nationalist frame-
works that have informed quantitative data collection in security studies.4
4 For the COW data, see: https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets; for UCDP data, see: https://ucdp.
uu.se/.
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The spatial dynamics of decolonization itself were also extremely complex and
characterized by global strategies that played out across multiple entangled and
interconnected sites in both the Global North and Global South simultaneously.
For example, the Moroccan independence movement was organized across four
continents and included a wide range of transnationally-networked actors,
including “British journalists, Asian diplomats, Egyptian Islamists, Coca-Cola
executives, Western labor activists, Catholic intellectuals, French socialists, a
Nobel Laureate, a US Supreme Court judge, Chilean businessmen, a former
American First Lady, and many others” (Stenner 2019, 3). The Algerian National
Liberation Front (FLN) operated from international bureaus across Europe, Asia,
Africa and North America, and also had operations and networks in Latin America
anddeveloped a global strategy that played theUSagainst theUSSR. Their strategy
included propaganda efforts that targeted audiences in the United States and
elsewhere, and included coordinated campaigns of violence that would maximize
media impact in capitals in Europe and North America. For example, the famous
Battle of Algiers was timed to coincide with a General Assembly session on the
Algerian question in an effort to draw greater attention to the conflict (Connelly
2002, 125ff; Nabuco de Araújo Araújo 2017, 406).
The global strategies that led to formal independence did not, however lead to
disentanglement between the colonial centers and peripheries. Instead, there
remained in place a structural and material interdependence that in many ways
replicated colonial structures. For example, the 1962 Evian Accords, which pro-
vided for formal independence of Algeria from France, nevertheless ensured that
France would maintain its economic benefits, including all rights related to the
petroleum industry. And, while there was an exodus of European settlers from
former colonies to Europe following independence, there was also a mass migra-
tion of formerly colonized people to the metropoles of Europe (Adamson and
Tsourapas 2020; Buettner 2018; Greenhill 2010).
In some cases, the structures of the colonial independence movements oper-
ating in France and elsewhere were simply transformed into official state emigrant
organizations, with states such as Algeria and Morocco using them as means of
controlling and surveilling populations abroad (Brand 2006). This also led to an
interpenetration of postcolonial and European domestic politics, resulting in the
transnationalization of some internal conflicts in postcolonial states – such as the
Moroccan Western Saharan conflict and the Algerian Civil War in the 1990s – to
states in Western Europe and elsewhere (Adamson 2005; Bank and Van Heur
2007). In such cases, the conflicts did not simply diffuse fromone state to the other,
but were deeply embedded in the structural connections and entanglements that
had developed over time from shared colonial and postcolonial histories.
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3.3 Global Migration and Entangled Security
Global migration connects states and societies in ways that further entangle do-
mestic and international security environments (Adamson 2005, 2006). Migration
and mobility inherently create connections across states, yet have often been
considered as peripheral to our understanding of global security dynamics. By
focusing on issues of migration we shed light on the extent to which different
regions of theworld are entangled via processes of border-crossing, the emergence
of global diaspora populations and other migration-related dynamics.
The 2015–16 Europeanmigration “crisis”provides an illustration of the need to
think holistically about questions of migration and security. It is estimated that up
to 80 percent of those migrants arriving in Europe in 2015 by boat were originally
from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria – all countries that had experienced or were
significantly affected by US and NATO military interventions.5 Libya had also
experienced a NATO intervention that hastened its transformation from a largely
migrant-receiving state to an unstable transit state that became a hub for migrant
smuggling activities (Greenhill 2016, 2018a, 2018b; Pradella andRad 2017; Sanchez
2020). Rather than treating the NATO interventions and the 2015–16 “crisis” as
separate events, an entangled security perspective provides a lens for showing
how Europe and the Middle East and North Africa are connected via complex
security dynamics. In this case military interventions in the Middle East, Central
Asia, and North Africa also created blowback in Europe through the effects they
had on stimulating migration flows and empowering repressive non-state actors,
which in turn fostered an increasing militarization of Europe’s external borders.
More generally, security- and economy-driven migration from one part of the
globe to another can adversely affect the domestic political and security situations
in others. Economic unrest in Cuba has at least thrice (in 1965, 1980, and 1994)
served as an underlying antecedent driver of then President Fidel Castro’s decision
to open the country’s border and permit Cubans to flee by sea to the US. Once in the
US, the presence of Cubans catalyzed riots and domestic unrest, especially in the
context of the 1980 Mariel boatlift, which then US President Jimmy Carter asserts
led to his defeat in the national election that November (Greenhill 2010). Similarly,
after a military junta seized power in Haiti in 1991, exiled President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide encouragedHaitians to flee to the US, which –when the numbers grew too
large and diverting the fleeing Haitians to Guantanamo Bay in Cuba became un-
tenable – drove the US under President Bill Clinton to threaten to intervene mili-
tarily to compel the junta to relinquish power and to enable Aristide to resume
5 Why is EU Struggling with Migrants and Asylum? BBC News 3 March 2016: https://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/world-europe-24583286 [accessed 31 January 2021].
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power (ibid.). In both cases, the security situations in tiny developing island na-
tions had security-driven reverberations in and for the world’s dominant
superpower.
In Europe, demographic trends leading to a greying and declining European
populationmean that most European countries would benefit from a larger supply
of skilled and unskilled labor. Yet, over the last decade the politics surrounding
migration has been defined by a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment and nativist
populismmore broadly,within Europe aswell as other parts of the globe (Greenhill
2016). These sentiments have thrust leaders with authoritarian bents into power in
a number of places throughout the globe and instigated democratic backsliding
within specific countries and regions and dramatic declines in freedom in the
world. As noted by Freedom House, 2019 was the 14th consecutive year in which
global freedom declined, while a number of advanced liberal democracies,
including the United States, have seen their degree of democracy rankings fall,
according to the Economist’s Index of Democracy, fueled in no small part by
policies and behaviors embraced by populist parties and their autocratic-leaning
leaderships (Economist 2021; Repucci 2020).
As was the case with Cold War covert interventions, cross-border migration
affects security in ways that can be both long- and short-term. For instance, in the
short-term mass out- or in-migrations can undermine or bolster the stability of
incumbent regimes, depending on the size, character, and nature of the group on
the move and how the group is perceived by actors within sending and receiving
states (Greenhill 2010). Over the long-term, remittances sent by migrants back to
their countries of origin can transform economic conditions while also having a
range of effects on domestic political conditions, with various studies showing that
remittances can alternatively bolster or challenge authoritarian regimes (Ahmed
2012; Escriba-Folch,Meseguer, andWright 2018). Shifts in security dynamics could
also take the form of diaspora lobbying in favor of (or against) the regime in the
sending state, which in turn may affect levels of provision of financial aid, military
assistance, or even direct military intervention, such as the aforementioned US-led
intervention in Haiti in the mid-1990s (Adamson 2006; DeWind and Segura 2014;
Greenhill 2010).
Entanglement and interconnectedness in the context of migration exists in
more structural and less broadly understood ways too. One example is the
connection between foreign direct investment (FDI) and migration. As Sassen
(1988) has persuasively argued, FDI can drive movement towards increases in
export manufacturing and agriculture (and away from subsistence-based alter-
natives), which in turn drive both displacement of domestic workers and increases
in the numbers of people engaged in wage labor. This in turn affects incentives to
migrate both domestically and internationally, which fosters greater cultural and
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ideological links with countries of investment as well as a decline in risks of future
migration, thus spurring further migration and connections with countries of in-
vestment. Not only may these dynamics lead to shifts in the demographic
composition of the populations of migrant receiving states, but also to shifts in the
security dynamics between these interconnected states. For instance, if domestic
economic displacement is not adequately addressed by substitution and migra-
tion, and governments in countries of origin are unable to cope, remittances can
produce problematic economic effects – in the form of pockets of unemployment,
resentments arising from perceptions of economic disparities, and financial in-
stabilities. Such economic problems can contribute to the root causes of various
forms of international criminal activities – including drug and people smuggling –
a lack of attention to environmental safety, cutbacks in social services, and un-
regulated large-scale migration and refugee flows, which, as noted above, can
engender entangled political, social and security consequences, both global and
domestic (Adamson 2005, 2006; Greenhill 2010, 2016, 2018a, 2018b).
4 Conclusions
Whereas the need to take a truly global approach has long been clear in relation to
a range of issues, most predominantly climate change and environmental crises,
the field of security studies has been slower in adopting a framework rooted in
globality. In this essay, we have suggested the analytical benefits of embracing a
global perspective on issues of security and conflict. By moving from a narrowly
state-centric perspective that emphasizes sovereignty and autonomy, to notions of
security entanglement that emphasize cross-regional and global interconnected-
ness, our ability to understand the complexity of a range of security dynamics in
the international system is enhanced.
We have applied this framework to the post-1945 international order to show
the extent to which it has been characterized by entangled security dynamics. By
shifting our analysis from a “national” to an “entangled global” perspective, we
can better understand a range of post-WWII phenomena such as the global nature
of the Cold War, entangled processes of decolonization and postcolonial security
dynamics, and the extent to which cross-border migration processes connect the
security environments of different states. All three of these examples raise issues
and perspectives that are often rendered invisible in more narrowly state-centric
analyses.
Looking forward, any understanding of future security challenges that is not
rooted in perspectives that take the globe itself as a unit and fundamental starting
point for analysis will be incomplete. Whether it be the impacts of economic or
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migration interdependence (Farrell and Newman 2019; Tennis 2020; Tsourapas
2018); the ways in which the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed underlying trans-
formations in the global economy (McNamara and Newman 2020); how public
health itself is a global and not a national security question (Elbe and Buckland-
Merrett 2019); or the role that new levels of virtual engagement may play in
reshaping patterns of cross-border interconnectivity, the necessity of under-
standing security entanglements as a distinct form of globality will only become
more consequential.
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